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Abstract: This paper examines the teaching of Applied Economics and 
questions whether it could be seen as a trendsetter providing a pluralist 
perspective via robust policy analysis. This is achieved through three elements. 
Initially by reviewing the characteristics of Applied Economics teaching in 
England & Wales we find very little variation in undergraduate pedagogy. 
Subsequently, we explore how the symbiotic development of economics and 
mathematics narratives could contribute to this rigidity. The results show an 
inherent idealism that inhibits and destabilises any value applied economic 
analysis could contribute to the pluralist position. Finally, we introduce Lakoff’s 
cognitive linguistics to explain how applied economics could impede the 
exploration of heterodox ideas. We conclude that Applied Economics teaching, 
as presently practiced in England and Wales, has less to contribute to the 
education of economists than typically asserted. Unless there is a conscious 
intent of highlighting pluralist implications in Applied Economics, we 
recommend a refocus on the study of the History of Economic Thought. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the nature of the ‘Applied Economics’ in higher education in England 
and Wales. Applied Economics is defined as a module principally designed to acquaint 
students with core policy inference skills, rather than the rarer and more confused use of the 
term to signify quantitative methods. It begins with a simple question: can the modules under 
scrutiny be considered a key component of pluralism in the economics curricula?  This stance 
finds its impetus in how realism is frequently forfeited for the sake of theory in many 
neoclassical economic modules. Reiterating the continued influence of Friedman (1953), it 
seems that economists need only to worry about the inconvenience of actual outcomes when 
assessing a theory’s predictions. With little need for model assumptions to conform to reality, 
in the explanatory words of Dow (2003, p. 13), theories “[are] simply instruments for 
predicting the values of variables”. In this context Applied Economics becomes a tool for 
investigating whether specific modelling ‘works’. This should ideally include an exploration of 
how particular theoretical approaches fail, and subsequently stimulate debate between 
different schools of thought in order to ascertain a better prediction for actual outcomes. 
More progressive interpreters of Applied Economics argue that it provides the perfect vehicle 
to introduce heterodox ideas not covered in core theoretical materials. Earl and Peng (2012, 
p. 194), speaking more generally about delivering pluralism in economics, write: 
“The big chance for heterodox economics lies in applied work where theories meet 
facts rather than simply being ‘proved’ mathematically for a stylized context. Here, 
pluralism has enormous Trojan Horse potential. The pluralist applied economist can 
present as a well-read researcher with no particular theoretical axe to grind, who is 
merely interested in finding out how a particular part of the economic system works.” 
In the hands of the heterodox economist, Applied Economics can be subtly mobilised, whilst 
ostensibly being deployed to introduce the vibrancy of economic thought; it can also covertly 
expose limitations that lie at the heart of the neoclassical theory taught at the introductory 
level.  
A contrasting, and arguably more negative interpretation of Applied Economics, is that it is 
used only as a forum for reiterating the unimpeded narrative of fundamental neoclassical 
values.  Re-affirming the apparent invulnerability of theoretical economic approaches, their 
limitations remain unchallenged. Stifling debate, Applied Economics can thus become a stage 
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on which to rehearse and re-rehearse lines learnt elsewhere. Whilst there may well be a 
genuine effort to illuminate topical economic issues, this approach constrains Applied 
Economics and relegates its role to one that necessarily engineers a narrow focus within the 
student cohort. This mostly finds form when the interpretation of empirical evidence is 
motivated by the desire to ensure consistency with apparent economic laws.  
To see how this particularly conservative visioning of Applied Economics operates, take for 
example the reaction to Card and Krueger’s minimum wage research, in which core concepts 
of labour theory were questioned. The barrage of criticism that ensued is pertinently 
encapsulated by Leonard, who posits that the reason why economists have been so resistant 
to the findings of Card and Krueger is because discovering the absence of any effect of 
minimum wage legislation on employment raises doubts about the core theory. As Backhouse 
and Biddle (2000, p. 16) note, “[t]heory is there to be applied, in the sense that models can 
be fitted to data and policy conclusions can be drawn, but the relationship is one-way”.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our review of Applied Economics 
in English and Welsh Universities. We investigate who is and who is not providing these 
modules. We investigate the required reading guidelines and the characteristics of learning 
outcomes. Together, without knowing the detailed lecture plans, this allows us to reveal some 
general characteristics of current Applied Economics curricula. Section 3 then asks whether 
curriculum reform is needed to deliver a pluralist perspective. First, taking a brief look into 
the History of Economic Thought, we analyse the language of neoclassical economics and 
explore how the historical evolution of economic discourse may intrinsically hinder any 
pluralist delivery. We consider whether simply applying neoclassical economics to policy 
problems is sufficient to engineer a form of ‘real world economics’. Second, we refer to 
linguistics and show how Applied Economics could be counterproductive to the pluralist 
cause. Third, we return to our review and analyse how choice of policy analysis has narrowed 
the teaching experience.  
 
2. Reviewing English and Welsh Applied Economics Provision in Higher Education 
There is significant variation in the design of degrees across the UK. For example, Scottish 
Universities, to generate a flexibility in design to enable a broader education, use a 4-year 
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degree system. Given that such differences will only generate further noise for our review of 
Applied Economics, we restrict our consideration to universities in England and Wales. Within 
these universities we use available on-line curriculum information for degree structures in 
either BA or BSc Economics programmes. Rejecting any university where this information is 
not provided in detail, we are left with economics programmes in 59 institutions. Overall, we 
find that Applied Economics at Year 1 and Year 2 of undergraduate education is only provided 
in 42% of institutions. It is therefore surprising how many economics graduates may proceed 
to their final year with very little visible application of economics to real-world problems. 
Table 1 summaries the key characteristics of the learning aims and outcomes mentioned in 
the Applied Economics modules at Year 1 or 2.  
[Table 1 Here] 
Not surprisingly, we find that three quarters of these modules refer directly to policy. A 
superficial undiscriminating glance—contextualising pluralism in terms of real world 
application— may suggest this is evidence of pluralist delivery. These modules could well be 
used to show the distinction between theory and practice. There are, however, potential 
problems with this viewpoint. First, it is noticeable that the second most popular required 
reading refer to textbooks used in Introductory Economics modules. While it is still possible 
that such orthodox texts are used as part of the critique of theoretical claims, only 25% of 
modules refer to ‘critical appraisal’ in their learning aims and outcomes. Attempts to improve 
the curriculum, such as INET-CORE, have also met criticism over insufficient innovation.  
Morgan (2014, p.10) is scathing of CORE’s contribution: 
“What began as recognition of fundamental problems that require fundamental 
change is becoming a more modest set of alterations. An initial recognition of failure 
within economics is being translated into a context of relative success, requiring more 
limited changes.” 
In addition, our fourth category- the breadth of economics- is rarely mentioned, suggesting 
these modules are not used to investigate the boundaries of orthodox economics.  
Policy is also often mentioned within the learning aims, typically in conjunction with the term 
‘analytical’. Analytical skills are an integral part of economics undergraduate training. Such 
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modules are consistent with the need to provide students with the Quality Assurance Agency 
for Higher Education (2015, p. 6) benchmarks: 
“to provide students with analytical skills and an ability to develop simplifying 
frameworks for studying the real world. They should be able to appreciate what would 
be appropriate levels of abstraction in order to study a range of economic issues and 
the specific assumptions that guide the criteria for simplification.” 
 
Within a monist perspective, such analytical skills can simply refer to the ability to apply 
models learnt within Introductory Economics, thus risk sliding into “naïve, superficial 
generalism(s) with little in-depth insight [or] problem solving capacity” (Groenewegen, 2007, 
p. 172). The standard approach may therefore merely reinforce the dominance of neoclassical 
theory and the failure to consider alternative schools of thought. 
Most modules focus on textbook reading support, with only a small percentage referring to a 
focus on journals and magazines. There is little variation in choice, with four different Applied 
Economics texts mentioned and preference for one clear choice. Devoted use of textbooks, 
as discussed in Watson et al. (2014), is typically inconsistent with the pluralist perspective. It 
immediately dictates and constrains the role of the teacher who (like the book) becomes 
unquestioned as students are directed towards a ‘truth’. This encourages an approach to their 
subject with few self-conscious reflexes, and limited ability to interrogate or understand their 
own situation in relation to it. The author/teacher is always right and the student’s role is to 
follow. 
We now turn to the characteristics of the institutions that currently are not providing an 
Applied Economics module option. As summarised in Table 1, we separate the relevant 
programmes according to two overall criteria:  
 Constrained Programmes: Programmes which perceivably have no room for an 
Applied Economics module due to module commitments elsewhere. We consider 
three aspects. First, many economics programmes are within business schools. Here, 
it is common to have a more uniform Year 1. This allows greater flexibility for 
academic transfers across disciplines. Second, we consider variation in technical skills 
across economics programmes. Thus, some universities may impose much greater 
6 
 
technical training on Year 1 students. Third, there may be a greater focus on more 
general skills training as universities target increased employability. 
 Alternative Approaches: There could well be better approaches to supporting 
pluralism in economics. Dow (2009, p. 42) makes a valid claim that the “questions 
posed by pluralism are essentially methodological and therefore require students to 
be both methodologically aware and methodologically informed”. We therefore also 
control for programmes that, rather than providing Applied Economics, offer History 
of Economic Thought and/or Economic History.  
Broadly speaking, the non-providers are equally split between our two criteria. Of the 
programme constraints, we do not find evidence that there is a restrictive reliance on either 
technical skills or the provision of more general employability skills. However, over a third of 
the programmes cannot offer Applied Economics modules because Year 1 provision is on a 
par with a joint honours in Economics & Business. More positively, we find a continued 
reliance on either provision of History of Economic Thought or Economic History. 
Our short review suggests a relatively conservative approach to Applied Economics. One 
possible response would be to replace such modules with an option in History of Economic 
Thought, Economic History and/or Economic Philosophy (Duhs, 2006). Investment in these 
areas may well be encouraged by key employers. The Economic Network’s employer survey 
(Pomorina, 2012), for example, includes responses from key members of Britain’s 
Government Economic Service (GES). Investigating weaknesses in economics curricula, there 
is evidence that the GES does see Economic History as a key subject skill. However, an 
alternative response would be to pursue a transformation of Applied Economics. We now 
investigate this further, using linguistics to highlight why there has been a tendency so far 
towards monist delivery. 
 
3. Applying Language & Linguistics 
There exists an abundant literature examining the application of language and linguistics 
analysis to economics (e.g. Samuel, 1990; McCloskey, 1995). Here, we offer a variant of this 
analysis to understand the difficulties in linking Applied Economics with the delivery of a 
pluralist perspective. This separates into three elements. First, we examine the origins of the 
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neoclassical narrative and argue that its development reflected the contemporaneous pursuit 
of mathematical certainty. This characteristic has subsequently become difficult to dislodge 
because of the perceived value of that certainty when applied to policy discussions. Second, 
we apply theories of cognitive linguistics to Applied Economics to explore how these modules 
are used to frame perceptions of truth. Policy analysis repeatedly frames certainty in response 
to the optimal strategies provided by neoclassical economics. Third, returning to our review, 
we provide examples of policy analysis to illustrate how this false sense of truth can hinder 
the learning experience and restrict critical appraisal. 
 
3.1 Argument 1: The ideological origins of Applied Economics 
One of the more frequent criticisms of neoclassical economics is its over-reliance on 
mathematics. Blaug (1997, p. 3), for example, writes, “Economists have converted the subject 
into a sort of social mathematics in which analytical rigour is everything and practical 
relevance is nothing.” Attacking the application of mathematics in economics, however, lacks 
academic merit. There are numerous textbooks, such as Elsner et al. (2015), which show how 
alternatives to neoclassical concepts can be even more technical in their design. The real 
problem is supposedly how neoclassical economics is essentially a meritless copy of the 
physics metaphor, as summarised by Mirowski (1989, p. 368):  
“[H]owever coy and ambivalent neoclassicals may appear to be about their physics 
metaphor, it cannot seriously be repudiated or relinquished, because there is nothing 
else that can hold the neoclassical research program together. In the absence of the 
metaphor of utility as nineteenth-century potential energy, there is no alternative 
theory of value, no heuristic guide to research, no principle upon which to base 
mathematical formalism, no causal invariant in the Meyersonian sense, and most 
threatening, no basis for the claim that economics has finally become scientific.” 
While we are not disputing this argument, to understand the lack of pluralism in economics 
we believe a more careful assessment of the role of mathematics is required.  Weintraub 
(2002, p. 2) rightly noted that “[i]f economics is intertwined with mathematics in the 20th 
century, in order to understand the history of economics we need to understand the history 
of mathematics”. Consideration of that history leads to a particularly pessimistic outlook for 
neoclassical economics within a pluralist context. 
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Marshall codified the modern economic approach. He could indeed be held responsible for 
the unnecessary complexity that was introduced and subsequently evolved to justify the 
privileged role of economists for policy making. In 1884, for example, he referred to how 
economists could become “a specialist voice in the art of policy-making” as theoretical 
training became “inaccessible to laymen”. There is also no disputing the relevance of Marshall 
for how Applied Economics is taught today. Ekelund and Hebert (2002, p. 198) note: 
“When we refer to neoclassical economics today, we usually mean the collection of 
tools of economic knowledge available to (and invented by) Marshall, channelled and 
directed into uses dictated by Marshall’s view of economic science.” 
However, Ekelund and Hebert also acknowledge that the tools of neoclassical economics 
substantially predate Marshall. Important figures include: William Whewell (1799-1866), who 
adapted mathematics to render economics more systematic; and the astronomer and railway 
engineer Dionysius Lardner (1793-1859), one of the first to sketch out the theory of the firm. 
So how can we understand the nature of mathematical analysis during this period? Key 
insights are offered by the detailed historical account provided by Cohen (2008, p. 14-15). 
Whewell is characterised as a Victorian idealist who yearned to find certainty through 
mathematics: 
“[He] cited the Roman naturalist Pliny the Elder, who declared upon the mathematical 
prediction of an eclipse, ‘Great men! Elevated about the common standard of human 
nature, [have] discover[ed] the laws which celestial occurrences obey.” 
The ‘elevated’ position of mathematicians in the heavens with access to celestial knowledge 
serves the progressive optimism of the 19th century particularly well. Scientists becoming 
gods in their own right as they not only uncover the secrets of the world, but master them 
through an increasingly sophisticated number system. The era in which economic language 
originated is therefore characterised by the noble desire to eliminate uncertainty via the 
precision of mathematics. Such a position of divine right echoes the sentiment of Plato who 
claimed in the Epinomis: 
“If numbers were banished from mankind, we could never become wise at all. One 
can hardly imagine a stronger assertion: Without mathematics- that God-given way of 
illuminating the universe- human beings would flounder in the dark.” 
In the quest for absolute accuracy and perfect meaning only numbers will do. Words are far 
too ambiguous, too inherently plural, and too vulnerable to misinterpretation. This would 
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seem to be anticipated by the philosopher John Wilkins (1614-1672) who attempted to avoid 
the uncertainties of speech by creating a new dialect based on symbols. As Cohen (2008, p. 
28), explaining the idealism, puts it: “Words can lie, distract, mislead, confuse, and advance 
false religion; clean notation, exemplified in the symbols of mathematics, cannot”. Implicit in 
Cohen’s terms is that there is something innately immoral about language’s fickle and 
wayward relationship with truth. 
The prevalent ideology of the time therefore can be summarised that the universe is divided 
into two planes: the sacred realm of the ideal and the profane realm of matter. This relates 
to the contemporaneous European narrative of Symbolism and, in this instance, it is 
mathematics that allows man to pierce the sacred veil between the real and the ideal. For the 
fiercely religious Whewell, the illuminating characteristics of mathematics lifts humanity 
closer to God’s ideal. Thus, it is possible to situate the origins of neoclassical economics firmly 
in a time where mathematical idealism is driven by the desire to emulate and attain a religious 
‘truth’.  
Economics derived its own language (linguistic and symbolic) from disciplines intent on 
proving their own infallibility, their privileged relationship with the infinite and importantly at 
the time harbouring little doubt that this state of perfection could be achieved. Such 
positioning explains why, even today, over one hundred years since neoclassical economics 
evolved, the chaos of the material world is considered irrelevant to the purity of the 
mathematical modelling. It also illuminates why occasionally the interference of reality is 
even scorned as a corruptive influence, diluting the pristine form of the discipline. The 
religious intensity which fuelled the ideals from which it emerged encourages such moral 
judgements. The idealism of the late 19th century is never far away from the current economic 
dialectic precisely because it still operates within the signification of that time.  
To summarise, during the late nineteenth century the discipline of economics experienced 
profound changes that culminated in the subject we know today. It parted company with the 
social sciences and sought less discursive methods to fix its interpretation of the world. But 
why has it been slow to adapt since? Fullbrook (2016, p.2), referring to the subsequent 
narrative pluralism which developed in physics, writes: 
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“The achievements resulting from this opening up of physics to other narratives have 
been even more spectacular than those that came from classical mechanics. Without 
that intellectual liberation, human reality would be radically different from what it is 
as I write.” 
We have indicated that, rather than just being a misapplication of early physics theory, 
neoclassical theory evolved from within the unyielding narrative of mathematical idealism. 
Borrowing from Herschel’s (1861) words on the abstract, it has hidden from the “reeling 
tempest of conflicting meanings”. Idealistic and shunning conflict, clear policy messages are 
generated. This creates further demands for clarity and further shifts the impurity of pluralist 
debate to the side-lines. 
 
3.2. Argument 2: Framing a truth with Applied Economics 
We now turn to how Applied Economics is used to support idealism within neoclassical 
economics. To do this, we apply the lessons provided by cognitive linguistics. The founder, 
Lakoff, argues that language is more than a communication device and that metaphor is the 
essential component of thought, “Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both 
think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 3). 
Language therefore triggers a mental landscape that shapes how we construe reality. The 
implications of Lakoff’s stance on how we understand political signification is dramatic. 
Debates suddenly become contests, not between each individual’s logical and persuasive 
rhetoric, but between substantial metaphors that act as shorthand keys to established and 
pervasive meanings that are difficult to challenge because they are never fully formulated. 
Rather than a rational electorate basing their conclusions on a logical pursuit of factual 
information, they look for frames that are “fixed in the neural structure of their brains” by 
sheer repetition.  
The promise of tax ‘relief’, for example, frames tax as an affliction, something which would 
ideally be avoided rather than a positive contribution to a society that repays and 
redistributes. Even the use of ‘benefits’ (currently the preferred public term for ‘welfare’) 
triggers a negative response – it necessarily implies that people are profiting from society in 
a way that others are not. To receive ‘welfare’ reinforces the hierarchy and explains why 
people are far more comfortable donating to food banks than to redistribute income fairly: 
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they do not believe then that someone is benefiting at their expense. This shorthand language 
feeds directly into very fixed hierarchical ideas of how society is structured and how equality 
should be achieved. It is easier to support the idea of the welfare state than it is to tolerate 
the benefit system, due to how language triggers an associative and repetitive response in 
the mind. 
So how can this be applied to Applied Economics? We can start by referring to how Applied 
Economics hypothetically operates. Gallardo (2004) neatly separates Applied Economics into 
two branches: 
 The Theorists: who, adopting a mathematical language, have little need to validate 
their approach through empirical models. 
 The Practitioners: who use applied models with the primary intention of formulating 
economic policy. 
This binary split necessitates a teaching system open to both positions. Ideally a dialogue 
between theory and empirical evidence should result in logical shifts that can be fed directly 
into policy making. This process is summarised in the following figure:  
[Figure 1 here] 
Lakoff’s approach offers a window into the linguistic shortcomings that inherently disrupt this 
logical process. If language operates how he suggests then all of the most familiar well-used 
terms in the economic lexicon become implicated as substantial metaphors that trigger a 
specific shared mental landscape. As long as the discipline operates with an awareness of this 
implicit meaning then its integrity cannot be called into question. However, without the 
linguistic self-consciousness that Lakoff liberates, debate in economics becomes just another 
metaphoric dance that is repeated endlessly as primary terms are exchanged ad infinitum 
without any real comprehension of what the words really mean.  
This is particularly pertinent for economics as the core terms have remained fixed for over 
one hundred years. In the light of this, Applied Economics can easily become a forum not for 
the enlightening process of analysis suggested in Figure 1, but for a process in which ‘sheer 
repetition’ of over-used terms replaces critical appraisal. Terms such as ‘perfect competition’ 
are themselves obstacles to debate as they immediately trigger and impose the abstract idea 
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of an illusionary epitome on the reality that refuses to accommodate it. The language is 
effectively resisting debate since it refers to a sanctified space which must be overcome 
before critical appraisal and policy implications can be addressed. At its extreme the exchange 
of metaphors in economics creates a language that essentially governs a closed abstract space 
where meaning is sustained only by endless repetition. 
 
Argument 3: The framing of Applied Economics involves restricting policy discussion. 
To refer to topic selection in Applied Economics curricula and how it is used as part of this 
exercise in repetition, we return to our review of English and Welsh Applied Economics. We 
investigate the topics covered and, with reading material considered, look at how policy 
analysis is treated. A summary is provided in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 here] 
The most popular topic is Labour Economics, which inspires more optimistically how Applied 
Economics can assist in delivering a pluralist perspective. For example, Winter-Ebmer (2014, 
p. 87), discusses the successful application of Behavioural Economics in labour analysis: 
“It is also a bit surprising to me that the actual International Student Initiative for 
Pluralism in Economics (www.isipe.net) is unhappy with neo-classical economics, but 
does not acknowledge the extensive and far-reaching insights from behavioural 
economics”. 
This appears to be promising. Lakoff also refers to the importance of Behavioural Economics, 
considering how the likes of Kahneman and Tversky explain economic choices through frames 
and metaphors. However, is this behavioural analysis within the labour curricula covered? 
The evidence suggests not. A superficial look at reading lists exposes a repetitive litany of 
neoclassical concepts, particularly supply and demand theory used to understand policies 
such as the minimum wage and migration. Profounder analysis— the application of ‘mini-
concordance’ analysis of a standard Applied Economics textbook— supports this stance. 
Figure 3 presents the top four ‘mutual information scores’ for the two most popular Applied 
Economics terms: ‘market’ and ‘competition’.  
[Figure 3 here] 
13 
 
The collocation of vocabulary is revealing. Given the preference towards studying Labour in 
Applied Economics, it is not unexpected to see such a strong occurrence of the word ‘market’. 
However, there is very little reference to individual ‘workers’, which suggests that the terms 
are fixed in a certain frame and that the analysis is typically another rehearsal of supply and 
demand. The fourth strongest association is with the term ‘free’, which frames the market in 
a particularly positive light. This influence is emphasized by the most common words 
partnering to ‘competition’ are ‘perfect’, ‘policy’ and ‘increased’, all referencing how the 
optimal nature of the market can be maintained. These linguistic conflations typify economic 
language which uses a relatively small pool of terms in a variety of hyphenated orders 
ensuring self-confirming repetition. This quick glance at the language sufficiently reveals how 
the principal terms constantly relocate the economic mind in the limited abstract space of the 
neoclassical framework. 
Other popular topics suggest that using ‘policy’ as a shorthand code for pluralism is indeed an 
overly optimistic leap. Consider, for example, Environmental Economics. Language cannot be 
trusted when a ‘policy’ topic on Environmental Economics such as global warming, coupled 
with the textbook Griffith and Wall, is used to push an idealised ‘least-cost solution’. The 
complexities associated with perceived overconsumption and overproduction, and their 
impact for our understanding of sustainability, are not mentioned in the text. 
This deficiency is highlighted further in the Financial Economies. Of the modules referencing 
this subject area, the financial crisis is only directly referred to three times. One case, 
however, does refer to how the crisis can be used to press the perceived importance of a 
behavioural macroeconomic stance. Through application of corruption and bad faith, there is 
a clear intent to show problems with the general assumption that the economy can be largely 
seen as self-regulating. 
Overall, however, the topics selected in Applied Economics suggest they are an excuse to 
support introductory microeconomic and macroeconomic concepts. Transport Economics is 
used, for example, to again replicate internalisation of externalities used within introductory 
microeconomics. Other popular topics include reference to macroeconomic policy and 
Industrial Economics (largely the consideration of privatisation). It is reasonable to assume 
that these modules are therefore mere shadow puppets disseminating the tenets of core 
provision and providing an occasion to further reinforce neoclassical core theory provision. 
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Our understanding of the topics covered is not complete. The textbook, with initial focus on 
standard neoclassical analysis, may subsequently be developed to critically assess conflicting 
perspectives. However, it is notable that only one subject area—Defence Economics—  
consistently refers to different schools of thought. Trying to appreciate the impact of military 
expenditure and arms production on the economy, reference is made to debate across 
liberalism and other schools of international political economic thought. There is also 
reference to internal debates within schools such as Marxism. This topic, however, is a rarity 
in Applied Economics. This arguably reflects how, although it is a relatively small sub-
discipline, there is less insularity as academics in this field struggle to alleviate difficult security 
problems. Elsewhere, inconsistent approaches adopted by non-economists are as likely to be 
ignored as the schools of thought which reject the neoclassical viewpoint. Strassmann’s 
(1993, p. 64) observation is illuminating,  
“As long as adherence to central stories determines theoretical importance, 
modifications that do not adhere to these stories will be marginalized and known in 
detail almost exclusively by those who specialize in them.” 
 
4. Conclusions 
Our review of English and Welsh Applied Economics indicates how three intertwined factors 
have constrained Applied Economics delivery. First, the influence of late 19th century 
mathematics generated an innate preference for policy analysis focused on delivering a 
technical optimal outcome. The notion of an economic approach capable of delivering an 
understanding of ‘truth’ becomes accepted. Second, Applied Economics— rather than testing 
the boundaries of economic analysis— is typically focused on reaffirming this truth. Through 
the lens of cognitive linguistics, we reveal how Applied Economics becomes easy prey for the 
repetition of neoclassical metaphors. Third, to maintain this repetition, the breadth of 
analysis covered is curtailed. 
Responding to these issues, one possible solution is to break away from Applied Economics 
and to more consistently provide modules in the History of Economic Thought, Economic 
History or Economic Philosophy. Here, students would be free from the rigid closed language 
of neoclassical economics to consider the most important, yet strangely overlooked, 
economic questions: “how so” and “why”.  
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There is, however, an alternative: transformation of the adopted pedagogical approach. 
Rather than using Applied Economics in support of core economic modules, the curriculum 
can instead focus on ‘wicked problems’. Batie (2008) summarises such problems as ‘social 
messes’, where analysis is difficult and solutions elusive due to the wide range of social and 
political factors that must be considered. Examples include terrorism, global climate change, 
poverty, crime, pandemics, and stem cell use, all ideal vehicles for the pluralist perspective as 
there is no consensus over policy and therefore a vital and immediate need to evolve a 
substantial debate between the different solutions offered by alternative viewpoints. 
Pluralism, rather than being a posture that one adopts, should refer to the liberated 
intellectual space which accommodates differing voices without any single one dominating at 
the expense of the others. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Applied Economics in England & Wales 
 
Learning Aim & Outcomes Mentioned % 
Policy Orientated 75.00 
Analytical Skills 41.67 
Critical Appraisal 25.00 
The Breadth of Economics 4.00 
 
 
Required Reading % 
Griffiths & Wall: Applied Economics 37.50 
Standard Micro/Macro Core Theory Textbooks 18.75 
Le Grand et al.: The Economics of Social Problems  12.50 
Bowmaker: Economics Uncut 6.25 
Freakanomics 6.25 
None: Use of Journals 18.75 
 
Characteristics of Non-Providers % 
Constrained Programmes 
Business 35.3 
Technical 8.8 
Employability 2.9 
Total 47.1 
Alternative Approaches 
History of Economic Thought &/or Economic History 35.3 
Social Science 17.6 
Total 52.9 
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Figure 1: Critical Appraisal in Policy Analysis 
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Figure 2: Topics Covered in English & Welsh Applied Economics Modules 
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Figure 3: Applying Text Analytics to an Applied Economics Textbook 
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